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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a discretionary appeal from an interlocutory order 
of the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presid-
ing, taken by Defendants Arco Coal Sales Company ("Arco") and 
Beaver Creek Coal Company ("Beaver Creek") pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court granted 
permission to pursue the interlocutory appeal by its Order of 
January 28, 1987. 
The action below is a suit by the Trail Mountain Coal 
Company ("Trail Mountain") against Arco and Beaver Creek claiming 
a breach of contract and other damages. Arco and Beaver Creek 
then filed a Third-Party Complaint claiming inter alia indemnifi-
cation from Nevada Power Company ("Nevada Power"). The proceed-
ings below are ongoing and discovery is under way. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying Arco and Beaver Creek's Motion to 
compel production of certain depositions taken in connection with 
a different action, where those depositions were taken under a 
protective order and were never published, and all witnesses and 
applicable documents are presently available to counsel for Arco 
and Beaver Creek. A copy of the trial court's November 24, 1986 
Ruling on Motion for Production of Documents (R. 372-374) is 
attached as Appendix 1. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bear 
upon this case in that the ruling appealed from is a denial of a 
Motion to Compel Production of Documents claimed by Arco and 
Beaver Creek to fall within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). Nevada 
Power contends, and the trial court found, that the documents 
requested fall instead within the scope of Rule 26(b)(3). While 
such rulings fall within the broad discretion of the trial court 
as documented below, the text of Rules 26 and 37 is set forth in 
Appendix 2 for the convenience of the Court. 
Arco and Beaver Creek also raise an issue with regard to 
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. A copy of that rule is 
set forth in Appendix 3 to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Nevada Power agrees with the statement of the nature of the 
case provided by Arco and Beaver Creek except with regard to the 
their last sentence. As set forth more completely in the 
Statement of Facts, below, the contracts between the parties are 
not "interrelated" but set forth two separate arrangements for 
the shipment of coal to Nevada Power. Among other provisions, 
those relating to the origin, nature and quality specifications 
for the coals differ markedly under these two arrangements. 
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2. Course of Proceedings in the District Court 
The statement of the course of proceedings provided by Arco 
and Beaver Creek is correct with the exception of the statement 
that "Trail Mountain voluntarily provided copies of the trans-
cripts of its witnesses1 depositions" (Brief p. 4). As noted at 
page 11 of the Transcript of the November 17, 1987 hearing on the 
Motion to Compel Documents ("Tr."), Trail Mountain did produce a 
few of the depositions of its witnesses but, following the objec-
tion of Nevada Powerf declined to produce further depositions. A 
total of some 20 depositions were taken in that prior action of 
which only four or five were voluntarily provided (Tr. 19-20). 
Both Trail Mountain and Nevada Power have declined to produce 
further transcripts. Arco and Beaver Creek then filed a Motion 
to Compel directed only to Nevada Power, which Motion was denied 
on November 24f 1986 (Appendix 1, R. 372-374). Arco and Beaver 
Creek then perfected this appeal. Discovery is under way and 
Arco and Beaver Creek have recently served some 43 pages of 
interrogatories and 17 requests for production of documents 
focused on the quality specifications of the contracts and the 
settlement of the Federal Court action between Trail Mountain and 
Nevada Power. 
3. Statement of Relevant Facts 
As noted in the Brief of Arco and Beaver Creek, the relation-
ships between the parties to this action are defined by three (3) 
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contracts for the sale of coal to Nevada Power, the electric 
generation utility for the southern portion of the State of 
Nevada, 
Contrary to the suggestion of interrlationship in the 
Appellant's Brief, these contracts describe two (2) independent 
and distinct arrangements for supplying coal to Nevada Powere 
The first arrangement involves a coal supply contract between 
Trail Mountain and Nevada Power for the supply of straight Trail 
Mountain coal to Nevada Power over a period of years (R. 22-38). 
This contract contains explicit quality requirements limiting the 
amounts of sodium oxide and setting forth other specifications 
relating to the performance of the coal in boiler operation 
(R. 24). Beaver Creek is involved in this first contract only by 
virtue of a separate loading agreement under which it loads the 
straight Trail Mountain coal onto trains for shipment to Nevada 
Power (R. 185-196). 
The second distinct arrangement for supply of coal involves 
a contract whereby Beaver Creek (then Swisher Coal Co.) agreed to 
buy Trail Mountain coal to blend with a by-product of Beaver 
Creek's own coal washing facility (R. 72-88). Beaver Creek sells 
the blended coal product to Nevada Power under a separate long-
term coal supply contract (R. 39-71) . This arrangement is 
independent of the contract for delivery of straight Trail 
Mountain coal and has different quality specifications, including 
a general requirement that the coal be "of a quality satis-
factory" for use in Nevada Power Company's boilers (R. 43). 
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Shipments of straight Trail Mountain Coal were suspended by 
Nevada Power in March of 1984 because of quality concerns. 
Because of its loading contract, Beaver Creek was advised by 
Nevada Power of the suspension of shipments (R. 109). Beaver 
Creek then unilaterally, and without instruction by Nevada Power, 
suspended shipments of coal by Trail Mountain to Beaver Creek for 
use in its blended product. Beaver Creek continues to make ship-
ments under its long-term contract with Nevada Power, replacing 
the Trail Mountain coal with that mined by Beaver Creek or 
coal purchased from mines other than Trail Mountain. 
Trail Mountain subsequently commenced a suit in Federal 
Court against Nevada Power contending that its contract had been 
wrongfully terminated (R. 13). Atlantic Richfield Company, an 
affiliate of Arco, was later named as an additional defendant in 
that action and, rather than filing an answer, filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint. The discovery conducted in the Federal 
Court action involved only Nevada Power and Trail Mountain; Arco 
and Beaver Creek were not parties to the action or to the settle-
ment. With the possible exception of an appearance at one 
deposition of an Arco employee, their interests were not 
Arco and Beaver Creek attach as appendices 1 through 8 to 
their Brief copies of various pleadings from the Federal 
Court action and, in footnotes 3 through 11 ask this Court 
to take judicial notice under Rule 201(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence of the allegations made therein. Nevada Power 
objects to the appendices and the request that this Court 
take judicial notice for the reason that such pleadings are 
not a proper subject for judicial notice, as more fully set 
forth in Argument IV, infra* 
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represented at all in the discovery or settlement negotiationso 
The Federal Court action was later compromised and shipments of 
straight Trail Mountain coal were resumed under restated quality 
specifications, Beaver Creek was notified of the settlement but 
declined to resume use of Trail Mountain coal in its blended 
product. 
The present state court action was filed by Trail Mountain 
against Beaver Creek and Arco. It addresses the unilateral suspen-
sion of shipments by Beaver Creek of Trail Mountain coal for use 
in its blended coal product and the refusal of Arco and Beaver 
Creek to resume their purchases, Nevada Power is involved herein 
as a result of Arco and Beaver Creek's Third-Party claim for 
indemnification and certain damages. 
This action thus focuses on the arrangements for shipment of 
Beaver Creek's blended coal product whereas the Federal Court 
action was principally involved with the quality specifications 
in the contract for straight Trail Mountain coal. The Trail 
Mountain/Nevada Power contract is only tangentially relevant to 
this action in that Beaver Creek apparently claims its refusal to 
blend Trail Mountain coal with its by-product was justified by 
Nevada Power's suspension of Trail Mountain shipments, notwith-
standing the different quality specifications. 
The dispute presently before this Court on interlocutory 
appeal arises out of the request of Arco and Beaver Creek to 
obtain all of the transcripts of depositions taken in the Federal 
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Court action (R. 277-285, 287-289). As noted, Trail Mountain 
initially produced several deposition transcripts but has now 
declined to produce further depositions (Tr. 11). The Motion to 
Compel and this appeal, howeverr involve only the objections of 
Nevada Power to production of the deposition transcripts. 
Nevada Power's objections were raised at the November 17, 
1986 hearing on Arco and Beaver Creek's Motion to Compel 
Production. The trial court found that, under the unusual circum-
stances of this case, the transcripts requested include attorney 
work product and because all witnesses and facts are available to 
counsel for Arco and Beaver Creek, they should proceed to develop 
their own evidence in the context of the issues of the present 
action rather than relying upon the work product of other counsel 
in an action to which they were not parties. Rather than proceed 
directly with that discovery, Arco and Beaver Creek elected to 
take this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Arco and Beaver Creek accurately state that, as the party 
claiming the privilege, Nevada Power bore the burden of demon-
strating to the trial court that the deposition transcripts in 
question contain work product (Brief, p. 12) . Contrary to their 
statement, however, Nevada Power fully met that burden and the 
trial court issued its Order sustaining Nevada Power's objection 
and directing Arco and Beaver Creek to obtain their information 
through other means. 
-7-
In discovery matters such as the Motion to Compel at issue 
hereinf the trial court is vested with broad discretion, which it 
exercised in declining to order production of the transcriptSo 
On appeal, the burden lies not with Nevada Power who successfully 
established its claim of privilege to the trial court, but with 
Arco and Beaver Creek who cannot demonstrate, under the peculiar 
circumstances of the present case, that ruling was an abuse of 
discretion. 
The depositions in question were taken subject to a strict 
protective order entered by the Federal Court without the partici-
pation of Arco or Beaver Creeko Those depositions were taken and 
filed under seal with the Federal Court and have never been 
published. All of the witnesses in question are presently avail-
able to Arco and Beaver Creek and all of the documents upon which 
they were examined may be discovered. There is, in short, no 
"fact" which is unavailable to these parties or which would act 
to their prejudice. No objective facts or witnesses are unavail-
able and each of these witnesses would need to be deposed again 
in this action anyway because of Arco and Beaver Creek's claims 
about the Trail Mountain/Nevada Power settlement which occurred 
subsequent to the time the depositions were taken. 
The ruling appealed from is not a broad declaration that 
deposition transcripts constitute work product, but rather is a 
carefully drawn ruling limited to the unusual procedural and 
factual background of this case. Against this background, the 
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trial court ruled that the legal theories and preparation of 
counsel in a previous action as embodied in the questions and 
framework of depositions taken under protective order and never 
published are work product as to a common opponent in a subse-
quent case. As work productf the depositions may only be ordered 
disclosed under Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure where -the discovering party demonstrates he is unable 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by other 
means. This is a narrow ruling of limitedf if any, precedential 
value. 
The arguments advanced by Arco and Beaver Creek relating to 
the pleadings in the Federal Court action and the intent of Rule 
32(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were not raised to the 
trial court and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Even considering those arguments, however, such pleadings are not 
the proper subject for judicial notice under Rule 201 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, and Rule 32(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is inapposite to this appeal as that provision 
addresses only the admissibility of evidence and does not purport 
to set a standard for discovery. 
The trial court has broad discretion in its consideration of 
motions to compel production and exercised that discretion soundly 
under the circumstances of this case. Arco and Beaver Creek have 
not demonstrated that the ruling was an abuse of discretion and 
they cannot make that demonstration because they have access to 
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all objective facts requisite to their various causes of action. 
The district court's order must therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT6S ORDER IS PRESUMED 
TO BE CORRECT AND ARCO AND BEAVER CREEK 
HAVE THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING ITS INVALIDITY, 
The determination of whether to require production of docu-
ments under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
discretionary with the trial court. This Court has stated 
"Unless it is shown that [the Court's] action is without support 
in the record, or is a plain abuse of discretion, it should not 
be disturbed." Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412, 
16 Utah 2d 97, 100 (1964). The Court also noted therein that the 
trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct and the burden 
on appeal of establishing its invalidity is on the party attack-
ing it. 396 P.2d at 412, 413, 16 Utah 2d at 100. See also 
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1974); Kohler v. Garden 
City, 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981). 
It is thus Arco and Beaver Creek's burden to demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion and to overcome the presumption of validity 
of the trial court's order. In this effort, the limited record 
available to the trial court must be construed in the light most 
favorable to the ruling made, Kohler, supra, and the ruling 
should not be disturbed without demonstration of a plain abuse of 
discretion. Tucker, supra. Such an abuse is not present in this 
record. 
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II. THE TRANSCRIPTS INCLUDE ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT. 
The basis for Nevada Power's objection to the production of 
the deposition transcripts from the Federal Court action was the 
work product of counsel as embodied in the preparation, questions 
and responses of those depositions. The thoughts and prepara-
tion of the attorneys in the Federal Court action contained in 
those transcripts may be considered attorney work product as to 
an unrelated party who appears as a common opponent in a subse-
quent proceeding. As work product, the depositions may only be 
ordered disclosed under Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure where the discovering party demonstrates an inability 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by other 
means. 
Oral statements given by witnesses to lawyers have long been 
considered work product and, indeed, were the subject of the 
seminal case Hickman v. Taylor, 67 S. Ct. 385, 329 U.S. 495, 91 
L. Ed. 451 (1947). In that case, the Supreme Court addressed the 
attempted inquiry into statements which conveyed the mental 
impressions of an attorney and found them protected. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Jackson concluded that, "Discovery 
was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its 
functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the 
adversary". Hickman, 67 S. Ct. at 396, 329 U.S. at 516. 
The courts have very rarely been asked to address the 
question of whether the mental impressions and preparation of an 
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attorney as embodied in the questions, objections and responses 
of a deposition can rationally be considered less important than 
the witnesses' statements referred to in Hickman. In Donut Shops 
Management Corp. v. Mace, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 195 (Callaghan) 
(E.D. Va. 1977), the case relied upon by the trial court, a copy 
of which is attached to this Brief as Appendix 4, this subject 
was addressed where discovery depositions had been taken in connec-
tion with a trademark cancellation proceeding. Thereafter, a 
subpoena was served seeking from counsel copies of the transcripts 
of all such depositions for use in a separate cancellation 
proceeding. The fact situation in Donut Shops is somewhat 
similar to the present situation, but the Court's reasoning with 
regard to depositions is much closer and more instructive than 
that found in any other reported case. It is the only case 
located by counsel for any party to this action involving the 
request by a party in one action for deposition transcripts taken 
in another action where the parties in the first action have 
compromised their differences and now face a common foe. 
The Court in Donut Shops declined to order production of the 
transcripts, reasoning as follows: 
The taking of discovery depositions for 
use during trial and/or settlement is an 
integral part of trial preparation - Locating 
the parties to be deposed, making the neces-
sary arrangements to take the depositions, 
and determining the questions to be asked and 
whether the deposition should be made a part 
of the record in the case, among other 
things, are all part of the attorney's prepa-
ration for trial. 
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As was said by Mr. Justice Murphy in Hickman 
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, at 512 (1947): 
'... [Tlhe privacy of an attorney's course of 
preparation is so well recognized and so 
essential to an orderly working of our system 
of legal procedure that a burden rests on the 
one who would invade that privacy to estab-
lish adequate reasons to justify production 
through a subpoena or court order. That 
burden, we believe, is necessarily implicit 
in the rules as now constituted.' 
Rule 26(b)(3) requires a showing of need 
and that a substantial equivalent of the 
material sought (here the depositions) cannot 
be had without undue hardship. 
Donut Shops has shown neither. 
23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 196. 
Arco and Beaver Creek seek production of deposition trans-
cripts, each embodying preparation for trial and attorney work 
product. They attempt to distinguish Donut Shops on the basis 
that the depositions were requested from an adversary's attorney 
but they do not respond to the Court's careful reasoning that 
depositions, in this narrow context, contain work product. 
Since, as the trial court found herein, the depositions in the 
Federal Court action do contain work product, Arco and Beaver 
Creek are not entitled to this discovery unless they meet the 
"undue hardship" requirements of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which is identical to the Federal Rule 
construed in Donut Shops. 
The deposition transcripts also meet the three requirements 
adopted by the Federal Courts to determine whether a document 
falls within the scope of the work product rule: (1) The item 
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sought must be a document or other tangible thing, (2) the item 
sought must have been prepared in anticipation of litigation or 
in preparation for trial, and (3) the item must have been 
prepared by or for another party or for that party's representa-
tive. City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Home, 100 F.R.D. 740, 747 
(D. Utah 1983); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 
88 (W.D. Okla. 1980). The depositions are clearly documents 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial 
and at the request of a party or a party's representatives. 
Arco and Beaver Creek argue that the presence of the court 
reporter and other parties establish an "open forum" inconsistent 
with the concept of work product (Brief p. 21). This argument 
ignores several salient facts. First, these depositions were 
taken pursuant to protective order, filed under seal, and never 
published; there was no "open forum" in the Federal Court action. 
Second, the presence of opposing counsel does not alter the 
"work product" analysis. His or her presence is required by 
procedure and rule. The court reporter is no different in this 
regard than counsel, of whom the Court in Donut Shops stated: 
Donut Shops then contended that even if 
the Rule 26(b)(3) requirements be applicable 
to nonparties, the attorneys for Chick'n 
G'Lore waived their immunity by taking the 
depositions in question in the presence of 
counsel for its adversary. 
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This contention is likewise without 
merit - The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
require that notice be given opposing counsel 
prerequisite to the taking of discovery depo-
sitions and that opposing counsel be given 
the right to be present and to cross-examine 
the deponent, if he be so advised. 
23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 196. This reasoning is directly appli-
cable in the present case. 
In addition, Arco and Beaver Creek's argument apparently 
confuses work product immunity with the attorney-client privilege 
which, by contrast, is waived by disclosure. 
The Federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit discussed 
the distinction between work product and attorney-client privi-
lege in holding that data base documents previously furnished by 
a corporation to the federal government in connection with 
previous anti-trust litigation need not be produced to a third 
party in a subsequent anti-trust action. The Court there stated: 
By contrast [with the attorney-client 
privilege], the work product privilege does 
not exist to protect a confidential relation-
ship, but rather to promote the adversary 
system by safeguarding the fruits of an 
attorney's trial preparations from the 
discovery attempts of the opponent. The 
purpose of the work product doctrine is to 
protect information against opposing parties, 
rather than against all others outside a 
particular confidential relationship, in order 
to encourage effective trial preparation. In 
the leading case on the work product privi-
lege, the Supreme Court stated: 'Proper 
preparation of a client's case demands that 
he assemble information, sift what he considers 
to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, 
prepare his legal theories and plan his 
strategy without undue and needless interfer-
ence.' A disclosure made in the pursuit of 
such trial preparation, and not inconsistent 
-15-
with maintaining secrecy against opponents, 
should be allowed without waiver of the 
privilege. ... So long as transferor and 
transferee anticipate litigation against a 
common adversary on the same issue or issues, 
they have strong common interests in sharing 
the fruit of the trial preparation efforts. 
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.f 642 F.2d 1285f 1299 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted.) 
This distinction between work product immunity and the 
attorney-client privilege is also discussed by Professor Wright 
who states: 
Thus the result should be that disclosure 
of a document to third persons does not waive 
the work product immunity unless it has sub-
stantially increased the opportunities for 
potential adversaries to obtain the informa-
tion. Most cases have so held and have found 
no waiver from disclosure. 
8 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
§ 2024 at 210 (1970) . The presence of the court reporter and 
opposite counsel at the depositions in the Federal Court action 
did not waive the work product immunity because those depositions 
were taken subject to a strict protective order and because the 
depositions were never published. The presence of these indivi-
duals, under the circumstances of that case, was not a disclosure 
that increased the opportunities of potential adversaries like 
Arco and Beaver Creek to obtain the information. 
Arco and Beaver Creek may obtain all relevant facts by review-
ing the source documents and deposing the witnesses; all that is 
presently unavailable to them is the preparation of counsel in 
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the other action as embodied in the prior transcripts. The trial 
court's ruling to this effect falls within the bounds of discre-
tion and should be affirmed. 
III. ARCO AND BEAVER CREEK FAILED TO SHOW 
SUBSTANTIAL NEED FOR THE INFORMATION OR 
THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO OBTAIN THE 
INFORMATION BY OTHER MEANS. 
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that attorney work product may only be discovered "upon a showing 
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable 
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of 
the materials by other means." In their Motion and Memorandum 
Arco and Beaver Creek demonstrated neither a substantial need for 
this information nor that they cannot obtain the substantial 
equivalent of the material by other meansf and no greater showing 
has been made on appeal. 
It has frequently been held that witness statements are not 
discoverable where the party seeking discovery has not shown the 
witness is unavailable to be deposed. See, e.g. , Gay v. P.K. 
Lindsay Co., Inc., 666 F.2d 710f 713 (1st Cir. 1981); Connelly v. 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339 (D. Mass. 1982). Similarly, 
it has been held that mere inconvenience or expense are not suffi-
cient to demonstrate undue hardship within the meaning of Rule 
26(b). United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640, 644 
(S.D. Ga. 1976); Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra. 
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Arco and Beaver Creek can depose all of the individuals who 
were deposed in the earlier action with regard to the facts and 
theories of the present action. As Arco and Beaver Creek aptly 
note at page 17 of their Brief, the purpose of discovery is to 
ascertain the facts. All such facts are presently available to 
Arco and Beaver Creek without exposing the work product of 
counsel in the prior action. The depositions given in the prior 
case are not essential to eliminate surprise, and Arco and Beaver 
Creek will not be unduly prejudiced by the trial court's order 
because all the facts are available to them through other means. 
IV. THE APPENDICES TO ARCO AND BEAVER CREEK'S 
BRIEF ARE NOT A PROPER SUBJECT FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Arco and Beaver Creek ask the Court in footnote to take 
judicial notice under Rule 201(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
of a series of pleadings attached as appendices 1 through 8 to 
their Brief. Their request should be denied because these plead-
ings are not a proper subject for judicial notice and because 
they were not presented to the trial court. 
Rule 201(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "A 
court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and 
supplied with the necessary information." Subsection (b) of the 
rule clarifies that "A judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
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sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." The 
pleadings in question do not fall within this definition. 
Arco and Beaver Creek submit 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and 
Error, § 492 (1962) as authority for this Court to take judicial 
notice of the Federal Court pleadings proffered. That section 
provides in relevant part "There are certain exceptions to the 
rule that an appeal must be decided solely on matters which 
appear in the record on appeal. For example, matters which may 
be judicially noticed in the appellate court may be considered 
although not formally included in the record." This section 
provides no support for judicial notice of allegations contained 
in pleadings from another case. 
Other sections of that treatise address those matters as to 
which an appellate court may properly take notice. At 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 58 it is stated that: 
"As a general rule, ... the courts will not 
take judicial notice of the proceedings or 
record in another cause, whether such cause 
was tried in the same court or in another 
court, so as thereby to supply, without the 
formal introduction of evidence, facts 
essential to the support of the particular 
cause before the court from those shown in 
the prior cause. This rule applies even 
though the other proceeding bears upon the 
-controversy under consideration, and even 
though it was between the same parties." 
Later the same section states "It is also generally held that 
courts will not, under ordinary circumstances, take judicial 
notice of proceedings in causes pending in other courts." 
Neither Arco nor Beaver Creek were parties to the Federal 
Court action. Atlantic Richfield Company was named but did not 
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answer or otherwise participate in the discovery in question*, 
Moreover, the allegations set forth in the various pleadings of 
which Arco and Beaver Creek ask this Court to take notice, are 
not "adjudicative facts" within the meaning of Rule 201 and are 
not a proper subject matter for judicial notice. 
Perhaps more significant than the subject matter of the 
proffered pleadings is the fact that these appendices were not 
provided to the trial court as a basis for Arco and Beaver 
Creek's Motion to Compel and, where matters are not provided for 
consideration to the trial court, they may not be injected into 
the action for the first time on appeal. Bundy v. Century 
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); Berger v. Minnesota 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986). 
For the reasons cited above, Arco and Beaver Creek's request 
that this Court take judicial notice of Federal Court pleadings 
should be denied. 
V. RULE 32(a) SETS FORTH AN EVIDENTIARY 
STANDARD AND DOES NOT DEFINE THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY. 
Arco and Beaver Creek argue that Rule 32(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the use of deposi-
tions taken in one action in a subsequent action involving a 
similar subject matter and parties, demonstrates that the trial 
court's ruling was erroneous. That conclusion does not follow 
for the following reasons. 
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Arco and Beaver Creek did not advance this argument to the 
trial court but rather have raised the question for the first 
time on appeal. It is axiomatic that matters not put at issue 
before the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., supra; Berger v. 
Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra. 
Even considering the arguments regarding Rule 32(a), it is 
apparent that those provisions are premature at this stage of the 
proceedings and inapposite to this appeal. Rule 32(a) merely 
sets forth an evidentiary standard for the use of depositions in 
court proceedings; it does not purport to expand the scope of 
discovery under Rule 26(b), nor does it alter the threshold 
requirement for the production of privileged material. 
The numerous cases cited by Arco and Beaver Creek in 
support of their Rule 32(a) argument address the subject of the 
admissibility of depositions as evidence. Without citation and 
discussion of each case in the context of this argument, the 
cases may be summarized as addressing variously questions of hear-
say, right of confrontation and cross-examination, and adequate 
identity of issues and parties; none of the cases addressed the 
scope of discovery or focused upon how copies of the depositions 
were obtained, and none discussed the discovery of sealed 
depositions taken pursuant to a prior protective order to which 
the party seeking the deposition is not bound. 
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Moreover, the Rule 32(a) standard is irrelevant because no 
deposition testimony has been offered as evidence in the present 
claim. The contention advanced by Arco and Beaver Creek that 
this privileged material, if obtained, may be admissible, is 
simply not a demonstration that the information is discoverable* 
Indeed, any attorney's notes, statements, communications from 
clients and other such privileged information may be relevant to 
an action and, if the privilege is waived, may be admissible* 
That documents may be deemed admissible is not a demonstration 
that they are also discoverable. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's discovery order was well within the broad 
bounds of its discretion. The court properly ruled within the 
context of this case that the deposition transcripts sought 
contain attorney work product as regards Arco and Beaver Creek* 
Implicit in the trial court's ruling is a finding that Arco and 
Beaver Creek failed to meet the requisite burden under Rule 
26(b)(3) for the production of such materials. 
Neither the arguments advanced to the trial court nor the 
new materials and arguments advanced on appeal demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion. Indeed, the trial court acted correctly in 
denying the Motion to Compel and directing Arco and Beaver Creek 
to proceed with their own discovery, an effort they have only 
recently commenced. For these reasons, Nevada Power submits that 
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the ruling on Motion for Production of Documents should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this (?) day of June, 1987. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent 
-23-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) copies of the fore-
going Brief of Respondent Nevada Power Company to be hand-
delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, as indicated, to the 
following named individuals this xQ_^day of June, 1987s 
John A. Snow, Esq. 
David L. Deisley, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 (hand-delivered) 
Thomas F. Linn, Esq. 
Co-Counsel for Defendants and Appellants 
P.O. Box 5300 
Denver, Colorado 80217 (mailed) 
William Be Bohling, Esq. 
Randall N* Skanchy, Esq. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
Suite 1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 (hand-delivered) 
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APPENDIX 1 
November 24, 1986 
Ruling on Motion for Production of Documents 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
a California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCO COAL SALES COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation, and 
BEAVER CREEK COAL COMPANY, ] 










• RULING ON MOTION FOR 
) PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 15080 
The Defendants, Arco Coal Sales and Beaver Creek Coal, 
have moved the Court for an order to compel the Third Party 
Defendant, Nevada Power, to produce transcripts of depositions of 
Nevada Power personnel taken in a case that was before the United 
States District Court involving Trail Mountain Coal and Nevada 
Power. Nevada Power has resisted the Motion, contending that the 
depositions were attorney work product developed in anticipation 
of litigation or trial and that they are therefore not subject to 
discovery. 
The Court has read and considered the memorandums 
submitted by the parties and has reviewed the cases referred to 
therein. 
The Court is of the opinion that the reasoning 
expressed by the Federal Circuit Court, as set forth in Donut 
Shops Management Corporation v. Mast, as referred to in Nevada 
Power's Memorandum is sound reasoning and is a logical extention 
of the attorney work product exclusion. 
The fact that the depositions were noticed up by Trail 
Mountain in the Federal case is of little consequence since 
attorneys for both parties are, under ordinary circumstances, 
present and participate in the deposing process. 
Since the names and addresses of the witnesses whose 
depositions are desired are available to counsel for Arco Coal 
and Beaver Creek, they should proceed to develop the facts and 
legal theories of their own case. It seems to the Court that it 
is better for an attorney to proceed in this manner than to be 
allowed to obtain his facts and legal theory from the work 
product of another lawyer in another case, even though there may 
be some closely related factual material in each case. 
THEREFORE, the Court denies the Motion to Compel the 
Production of the Depositions. 
DATED this ^<^r~ day of November, 1986. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I mailed true and correct 
copies of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Robert A. Peterson 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Elliott Lee Pratt 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON 
Attorneys at Law 
77 West Second South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William B. Bohling 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 Interstate Bank Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dated this J?^yrf- day of November, 1986. 
/ Secretary 
APPENDIX 2 
Rules 26 and 37 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
evidence of in civil or cnmmal action, 21 and effect of clause in, prohibiting transfer of 
A.L.R.3d 418. franchise or contract. 59 A.L.R.3d 244. 
Attorney's death prior to final adjudication Wrongful death, modern status of rule deny-
or settlement of case as affecting compensation ing a common-law recovery for, 61 A.L.R.3d 
under contingent fee contract, 33 A.L.R.3d 906. 
1375. Conservator or guardian for an incompetent. 
Validity, in contract for installment sale of priority and preference in appointment of, 65 
consumer goods, or commercial paper given in A.L.R.3d 991 
connection therewith, of provision waiving, as Defamation action as surviving plaintiffs 
against assignee, defenses good against seller. death, under statute not specifically covering 
39 AX.R.3d 518. action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272. 
Franchise contract, validity, construction. Key Numbers. — Parties <*=> 59. 
PART V. 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY. 
Rule 26, General provisions governing discovery, 
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission, 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter. 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information sought appears reasonanly calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i> the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or 
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision <c». 
(2) Insurance agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the exis-
tence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person 
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reim-
burse for payments made to satisfy the judgment Information concerning 
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the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in 
evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insur-
ance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement. 
(3) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivi-
sion (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision »b>* 1 > of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a show-
ing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials 
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has 
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation.. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concern-
ing the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon 
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by 
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court 
order. The provisions of Rule 37<a)(4> apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a 
statement previously made is < A) a written statement signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by the person making it, or iB) a stenographic, me-
chanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is 
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person mak-
ing it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(4) Trial preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opin-
ions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Sub-
division (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: 
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party 
to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an 
expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the ex-
pert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of 
the grounds for each opinion. 
(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by 
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such 
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision ibu4)(C> of this rule, con-
cerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate. 
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an ex-
pert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not ex-
pected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35<b) 
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opin-
ions on the same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result. 
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(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivisions (b>(4)<A)(ii) and ibx4><B) of this 
rule; and 
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect 
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (bx4)(B) of this rule the 
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred 
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the ex-
pert. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
ll) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and condi-
tionsv including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents v informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by *he court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied m whole or in part the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any part\ or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37* an 4» apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for 
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that 
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery 
<e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a re-
quest for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, 
except as follows: 
( D A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to < A* the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and < B> the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the 
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance o( his 
testimony. 
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(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which i A) he knows that the re-
sponse was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
if) Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action, 
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a 
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by 
the attorney for any party if the motion includes: 
( D a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and 
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has 
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on 
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are 
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the 
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters 
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after 
service of the motion. 
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tenta-
tively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and 
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determin-
ing such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary 
for the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered 
or amended whenever justice so requires. 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference 
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery 
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state 
his address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification 
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: '1) 
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law: i2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and '3> not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the 
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection 
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or 
79 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to 
it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifica-
tion, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount 
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a rea-
sonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an 
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person 
within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and 
limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided 
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person 
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further 
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the 
rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court 
in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Depositions upon oral examination. Rule 
ment deleted the former second sentence in 30(o. 
Subdivision (a), relating to frequency of use of Depositions, use in court proceedings. Rule 
discovery methods, added the second para- 32. 
graph in Subdivision <b)(l). inserted "other- Depositions, when taken. Rule 30(a). 
wise discoverable" and "and acquired or devel- Exclusion of deposition from evidence. Rule 
oped in anticipation of litigation or for trial" in 32(b». 
the introductory language of Subdivision Expert and other opinion testimony, Rules 
(b)(4), redesignated former Subdivisions 701 to 706. U.R.E. 
(b)(4)(A) and (b)(4)(B) as present Subdivisions Liability insurance, admissibility of. Rule 
(b)(4KB) and (b)(4)(C). respectively, and re- 411. U.R.E. 
wrote the contents thereof, inserted Subdivi- Motions, evidence on, by depositions. Rule 
sions (b)(4)(A), (f) and (g>, and redesignated for- 43<e< 
mer Subdivision <f) as present Subdivision <h). Privileges, $$ 78-24-8. 73-24-9; Rule 501, 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds U.R.E. 
to Rule 26, F.R.C.P. Summary judgment, discovery supporting or 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi- opposing motion for. Rule 56(e) 
dence, § 78-21-3; Rule 43(a). Terminate or limit examination, motion to. 
Continuance to permit discovery, Rule 56(f). Rule 30(d). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
—Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Applicability of rule. 
Purpose of rule. 




—Preparation of materials in anticipation of litigation. 
Discovery from state. 
Eminent domain. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions facts not within his personal knowledge, 20 
and Discovery $$ 314 to 325 A.L.R.3d 756. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.3. Discovery §S 88 to 110. Formal sufficiency of response to request for 
A.L.Ro — Continuance sought to secure tes- admissions under state discovery rules. 8 
timony of absent witness in civil case, admis- A.L.R.4th 728. 
sions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. Permissible scope, respecting nature of m-
party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil quiry, of demand for admissions under modern 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and state civil rules of procedure. 42 A.L.R.4th 489. 
rules, to respond to request for admission of Key Numbers. — Discovery «=» 121 to 129. 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31. or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34. fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. When taking a deposition on »ral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
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If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination: 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs <A), (B). and <C» of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce >uch 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advis-
ing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney 
fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36ia), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
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(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and iC) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to-any other party 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- poena of person in foreign country, and ex-
ment substituted "shall" for "may" near the penses against United States, respectively, and 
beginning of the first and second paragraph of made a series of minor word changes through-
Subdivision (a)(4). inserted "or if a party fails out Subdivision- a* and 'bt. 
to obey an order entered under Rule 28(0" in Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
the introductory language of Subdivision to Rule 37. F R C P 
tb)(2). substituted present Subdivision <e» for Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
former Subdivisions e* and if), relating to sub- * 78-32*1 et seq 
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—Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Attorney fees. 
Expenses on failure to admit. 
—Failure to respond to requests. 
Failure to comply with order. 
—Arrest of party. 
Failure to appear at deposition. 
—Arrest of witness. 
Failure to produce documents. 
—Discretionary sanctions. 
—Dismissal without prejudice. 
—Judgment. 
Failure to produce documents. 




Utah Rules of Evidence 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 201 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Hill v Hartog, 658 P 2d 1206 (Utah 
1983), State v Smith, 700 P 2d 1106 (Utah 
1985) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 338(4) 
§§ 262, 263 368, 422 to 428, 507 to 512, Evidence «=» 148 
C.J.S. — 22A C J S Criminal Law ^ 602, 
754 et seq , 31A C J S Evidence * 186 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded 
statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is dence (1971* was not as specific, but Rule 106 
the federal rule, verbatim Utah Rules of Evi- is otherwise in accord with Utah practice 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L Rev 63 73 
ARTICLE II. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201c Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either 11) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding 
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(g) Instructing jury* ^n a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in 
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accent 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the 
law of judicial notice formerly contained in 
Rules 9 through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and in Utah Code Annotated, § 78-24-1 
[78-25-1] (1953) [superseded by this rule] into 
one broadly defined rule. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the rule with reference to ju-
dicial notice in Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. 
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 267, 289 Pac. 116 (1930) 
where the court stated: "In short, a court is 
presumed to know what every man of ordinary 
intelligence must know about such things." 
See also DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980). 
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice 
of adjudicative facts/' and does not deal with 
instances in which a court may notice legisla-
tive facts, which is left to the sound discretion 
of trial and appellate courts. Compare Rule 12, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Since legisla-
tive facts are matters that go to the policy of a 
rule of law as distinct from the true facts that 
are used in the adjudication of a controversy 
they are not appropriate for a rule of evidence 
and best left to the law-making considerations 
by appellate and trial courts. 
Subdivision (b) is in accord with the Little 
Cottonwood Water Co. case, supra, and the 
substance of Rule 9(1) and (2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). Utah law presumes that the 
law of another jurisdiction is the same as that 
of the State of Utah and judicial notice has 
been taken from the law of other states and 
foreign countries. Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 
P.2d 200 (Utah 1976); Maple v Maple, 566 
P.2d 1229 (Utah 1977). The Utah court has 
taken judicial notice under Rule 9(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) of the rules and regu-
lations of the Tax Commission. Nelson v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162, 506 P.2d 437 
(1973). The broad language of subdivision (b) is 
identical to Rule 201 of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence (1974). Judicial notice of foreign law 
is permissible under this rule. Provisions f 
this rule supersede Utah Code Annotated, Se! 
tion 78-25-1 (1953) [superseded by this rule)* 
since the statute is merely illustrative of item 
encompassed within the broad framework
 0f 
this rule. The foreign law of some jurisdictions 
might best be left to proof through witnesses if 
the resort to sources available in the State of 
Utah is questionable. 
Subdivision (c) is discretionary, but subdivj. 
sion <d) requires the court to take judicial no-
tice if requested by a party and if supplied with 
the necessary information to make a determi-
nation of whether to take judicial notice. Com-
pare Rules 9(2) and 10(3), Utah Rules of Evi-
dence < 1971). The committee believes that Rule 
201(d) simplifies the process of taking judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts by making it man-
datory when a party makes a request therefor 
and supplies the court with the necessary in-
formation. 
Subdivision <e) is similar to Rule 10(1), (2) 
and (3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (g> is in accord with Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Evidence 11971). The provision 
that in a criminal case the court shall instruct 
the jury that it may but is not required to ac-
cept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed 
has no counterpart in Utah RUIPS of Evidence 
(1971) Accord, State v Lawrence, 120 Utah 
323. 234 P.2d 600 11951). See also. Amendment 
VI. Constitution of the United States. 
Cross-References. — Court to impart mat-
ters of judicial knowledge to jury, § 78-21-3. 
Jury bound to accept declaration of judicial 
knowledge, $ 78-21-3. 
Municipalities, notice of existence and classi-
fication, $ 10-2-306. 
Ordinance or private statute, notice of. Rule 
9(i), U.R.C.P. 
Seal of industrial commission, notice of, 
§ 35-1-8. 
Seal of public service commission, notice of, 
§ 54-1-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of judicial notice. 
Kinds of facts. 
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DONUT SHOPS MANAGEMENT CORP. v. MACE 
US Dist Ct, ED Va, January 14,1977 
23 FR Serv2d 195 
26b.76 Discovery of trial preparation materials in related trademark cancella-
tion proceeding. 
Petitioner in a trademark cancellation proceeding would not be entitled to 
discover depositions taken in a related trademark cancellation proceeding against 
the same respondent where petitioner failed to make the requisite Rule 26(b) (3) 
showing that it had substantial need for the depositions and that their substantial 
equivalent could not be obtained without undue hardship. The taking of the 
discovery depositions was an integral part of the trial preparation in the other 
proceeding, the names of the deponents were a part of the record in the other 
proceeding, and petitioner's attorneys could make the necessary arrangements 
to take their depositions. 
LEWIS, Senior District Judge. Both Donut Shops Management Corp., herein-
after called Donut Shops, and Chick'n G'lore have separate pending petitions in 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, seeking cancellation of the 
federal trademark registration owned by John H. Mace—The cancellation pro-
ceedings are Nos. 11,102 and 11,073, respectively. 
The attorneys for Chick'n G'lore, in preparing for trial in Trademark Can-
cellation Proceeding No. 11,703, took discovery depositions of certain persons in 
Mississippi believed to have knowledge of the history of the trademark covered 
by Mace's registrations. Notices for the taking of these depositions were timely 
filed in the Patent and Trademark Office. 
These attorneys have also been talking settlement with the attorneys for 
Mace, which is expected to include a merger of their respective trademark rights. 
Shortly after the depositions were taken Donut Shops' attorneys served 
Chick'n G'lore with a notice of alleged infringement of its trademark rights. 
Some time thereafter Donut Shops obtained a subpoena from the clerk of this 
court commanding the attorney for Chick'n G'lore to appear in Trademark 
Cancellation Proceeding No. 11,102 for the taking of a deposition concerning the 
above entitled action and to bring copies of transcripts of any and all depositions 
taken by deponents on behalf of Chick'n G'lore's Cancellation No. 11,073. 
Chick'n Glore's counsel timely moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum on 
the ground that Donut Shops had failed to show that it had substantial need of 
the materials requested in the preparation of its case and that it was unable, 
without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials 
by other means—as required by Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Donut Shops responded by claiming the 26(b)(3) "qualified immunity" applied 
only to the parties in the suit in which the discovery was sought. 
This contention is completely decimated by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 
F2d 480 (1973), wbfirein Judge Field, speaking for the court, stated— 
"On balance, we think the legal profession and the interests of the 
public are better served by recognizing the qualified immunity of work 
product materials in a subsequent case as well as that in which they 
were prepared, and this in our opinion comports with the statement 
in Hickman." 
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"In some cases the courts have held that documents prepared for 
one case are protected in a second case only if the two cases are 
'closely related.' In our opinion to dispose of this delicate and important 
question by such a technical touchstone is incompatible with the essential 
basis of the Hickman decision." (p 484, fn 15 and cases cited therein) 
Donut Shops then contended that even if the Rule 26(b)(3) requirements be 
applicable to nonparties, the attorneys for Chick'n G'lore waived their immunity 
by taking the depositions in question in the presence of counsel for its adversary. 
This contention is likewise without merit—The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure require that notice be given opposing counsel prerequisite to the taking 
of discovery depositions and that opposing counsel be given the right to be 
present and to cross-examine the deponent, if he be so advised. 
The taking of discovery depositions for use during trial and/or settlement 
is an integral part of trial preparation—Locating the parties to be deposed, 
making the necessary arrangements to take the depositions, and determining 
the questions to be asked and whether the deposition should be made a part of 
the record in the case, among other things, are all part of the attorney's 
preparation for trial. 
As was said by Mr. Justice Murphy in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 US 495, 
at 512 (1947): 
". . . [T]he privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is so well 
recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal 
procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy 
to establish adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena 
or court order. That burden, we believe, is necessarily implicit in the 
rules as now constituted." 
Rule 26(b)(3) requires a showing of need and that a substantial equivalent 
of the materials sought (here the depositions) cannot be had without undue 
hardship. 
Donut Shops has shown neither. 
The names and addresses of the deponents have been made a part of the 
record in Cancellation Proceeding No. 11,073—Their attorneys may make the 
necessary arrangements for the taking of the depositions of the deponents for 
use in Cancellation Proceeding No. 11,102, if they be so advised—But they cannot 
be obtained by the subpoena issued by the clerk of this court prior to being 
made a part of the record in Cancellation Proceeding No. 11,073, as provided 
for by Rule 2.120(3) of the Patent and Trademark Office. 
Donut Shops seeks more than the depositions in question—They also want to 
take the testimony of the attorney that took the depositions. 
Had the required showing been made, the attorney would have been pro-
tected against disclosure of his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or 
legal theories concerning the litigation. 
Therefore, the motion to quash the subpoena issued by the clerk of this 
court ought to be granted, and 
It is so ordered. 
Whether the depositions sought are obtainable from the parties in Cancellation 
Proceeding No. 11,073 or the court reporter that took them is not before this 
court for determination in this proceeding—The court decrees only that Donut 
Shops cannot obtain the depositions from the attorneys for Chick'n G'lore prior 
to their being made a part of the record in Trademark Cancellation Proceeding 
196 
23 FEDERAL RULES SERVICE 2d—CASES 
No. 11,073 now pending in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and 
then only upon compliance with Rule 45(b) (1) and (2). 
The Clerk will send a copy of this memorandum opinion and order to all 
counsel of record. 
SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OP THE 
UNITED STATES 
US Dist Ct, D Md, March 16,1977 
23 FR Serv2d 197 
26cl6, 26c.41, 37a.l, 45d.62 Protective orders sought by nonparties; what court 
may act. 
Proceedings by nonparties to an action to quash subpoenas duces tecum and 
to obtain a protective order in connection with the taking of their depositions 
by the plaintiffs would be transferred from the district in which the nonparties 
resided and where the depositions were proposed to be taken to the district where 
the main action was pending. While a nonparty may seek such a protective order 
in either court, in view of the fact that the issues raised in the main action 
appeared to be complex and any determination as to the propriety of granting 
a protective order or other relief would require consideration of many of the 
substantive issues in the main action, such a determination should be made by 
a judge thoroughly familiar with all the facts of the case. Plaintiffs would be 
required to pay all additional counsel fees and travel and subsistence expenses of 
the nonparties and their counsel which would be caused by the transfer order. 
J. Frederick Motz and Craig E. Smith, Baltimore, Maryland, for John and 
Louise Rees. 
Michael Krinsky and Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard, of New York, New York, 
and Irwin Brown, of Baltimore, Maryland, for plaintiffs Socialist Workers 
Party, et al. 
KAUFMAN, District Judge. John and Louise Rees, non-parties to this case, 
which is pending before Judge Thomas P. Griesa in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, have instituted this proceeding in 
this court seeking to quash subpoenas duces tecum, and to obtain a protective 
order in connection with the taking of their depositions sought by the Socialist 
Workers Party, et al. (hereinafter called plaintiffs). Plaintiffs seek to depose 
Mr. and Mrs. Rees in this district and in accordance with Federal Civil Rule 
45(d)(2). 
While plaintiffs have not formally filed any motion to transfer the issues 
raised in the within case for determination in and by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New* York, they have in several documents in 
which they oppose the relief sought herein by Mr. and Mrs. Rees specifically 
asked this court so to transfer said issues. Mr. and Mrs. Rees vigorously chal-
lenge this court's power so to transfer. 
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Civil Rules provides, in relevant part, that "[u]pon 
motion by . . . the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause 
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